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Abstract
According to the integrated information theory, the quantity of consciousness is the amount of integrated information
generated by a complex of elements, and the quality of experience is specified by the informational relationships it
generates. This paper outlines a framework for characterizing the informational relationships generated by such systems.
Qualia space (Q) is a space having an axis for each possible state (activity pattern) of a complex. Within Q, each
submechanism specifies a point corresponding to a repertoire of system states. Arrows between repertoires in Q define
informational relationships. Together, these arrows specify a quale—a shape that completely and univocally characterizes
the quality of a conscious experience. W— the height of this shape—is the quantity of consciousness associated with the
experience. Entanglement measures how irreducible informational relationships are to their component relationships,
specifying concepts and modes. Several corollaries follow from these premises. The quale is determined by both the
mechanism and state of the system. Thus, two different systems having identical activity patterns may generate different
qualia. Conversely, the same quale may be generated by two systems that differ in both activity and connectivity. Both
active and inactive elements specify a quale, but elements that are inactivated do not. Also, the activation of an element
affects experience by changing the shape of the quale. The subdivision of experience into modalities and submodalities
corresponds to subshapes in Q. In principle, different aspects of experience may be classified as different shapes in Q, and
the similarity between experiences reduces to similarities between shapes. Finally, specific qualities, such as the ‘‘redness’’ of
red, while generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it, but require considering the entire quale. Ultimately, the
present framework may offer a principled way for translating qualitative properties of experience into mathematics.
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Introduction
Consciousness poses two main problems [1]. First, what are the
necessary and sufficient conditions that determine the quantity of
consciousness generated by a system? Is a system enjoying vivid
experiences, is it dimly aware, or is it completely unconscious? We
know that the corticothalamic system (or parts of it) generates an
incessant stream of experience, which only ceases when we fall into
dreamless sleep, or when the cortex is severely damaged. By
contrast, the cerebellum - a part of our brain as complicated and
even richer in neurons than the cortex – does not seem to generate
much experience at all: if the cerebellum has to be removed
surgically, consciousnessis hardlyaffected. What is special about the
corticothalamic system, then, that is not shared by the cerebellum?
Second, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions that
determine the quality of consciousness? What makes an experience
visual, auditory, or both? What makes a color a color, and red red,
and what makes red different from blue, a triangular shape, or a
high C on an oboe? Again, empirical evidence indicates that
different parts of the cortex influence different qualitative aspects of
consciousness. For example, damage to certain parts of the cortex
can impair the experience of color, whereas other lesions may
prevent you from experiencing visual shapes, and other lesions may
abolish auditory, rather than visual perception. Why is this so?
The integrated information theory (IIT) [1] attempts to provide
a principled answer to these questions. By starting from phenome-
nology and making a critical use of thought experiments, the IIT
claims that: i) the quantity of consciousness is the amount of
integrated information generated by a complex of elements; ii) the
quality of consciousness is specified by the set of informational
relationships generated among the elements of a complex.
The quantity of integrated information
Informativeness is a key property of consciousness, as can be
realized by considering the photodiode thought experiment [1].
Briefly, you and a photodiode face a blank screen that is
alternately on and off. When you look at the screen, you ‘‘see’’
light or dark. The photodiode can also discriminate between the
screen being on or off, but presumably it does not consciously see
anything. According to the IIT, the key difference between you
and the photodiode has to do with how much information is
generated when the discrimination is made. Information is
classically defined as reduction of uncertainty. When the blank
screen turns on, the mechanism in the photodiode discriminates
between 2 alternatives (the current from the sensor is above rather
than below a threshold) and thereby generates log2(2)=1 bit of
information. On the other hand, when you ‘‘see’’ light, the
mechanisms in your corticothalamic system discriminate among a
much large number of alternatives: all other experiences you could
possibly have had, but did not have (a dark screen, to be sure, but
also a blue screen, a checkerboard screen, any frame from any
possible movie, with or without any possible sound, and so on).
Thus, you generate a much larger amount of information.
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Consider an idealized digital camera whose sensor chip is made up
of 1 million binary photodiodes. Though such a camera could
discriminate among a very large number of states (2
1,000,000,
corresponding to 1,000,000 bits of information), it is hard to
imagine that it would be generating vivid experiences. According
to the IIT, the key difference between you and the camera has to
do with integrated information. From the perspective of an external
observer, the camera chip has a large repertoire of states. From an
intrinsic perspective, however, the sensor chip can be considered
as a collection of one million photodiodes with a repertoire of two
states each, rather than as a single integrated system with a
repertoire of 2
1,000,000 states. This is because, due to the absence of
interactions among the photodiodes within the sensory chip, the
state of each element is causally independent of that of the other
elements. Indeed, if the sensor chip were literally cut down into
individual photodiodes, the performance of the camera would not
change at all. By contrast, the repertoire of states available to you
cannot be subdivided into the repertoire of states available to
independent components. This is evident phenomenologically:
when you consciously ‘‘see’’ a certain image, that image is
experienced as an integrated whole and cannot be subdivided into
component images that are experienced independently, such as
the left half of the visual field of view independently of the right
half. Underlying this unity is a multitude of causal interactions
among the relevant parts of your brain. Indeed, unlike
disconnecting the photodiodes in a camera sensor, disconnecting
brain regions has profound effects. For example, when the 200
million fibers linking the two cortical hemispheres are cut to
alleviate severe seizures, consciousness literally splits in two [2]: the
left hemisphere experiences the right half of the visual field, the
right hemisphere the left half, and nobody sees the whole picture.
Based on these considerations, the IIT goes on to claim that the
quantity of consciousness of a physical system is related to the
repertoire of different states (information) that can be discrimi-
nated by the system as a whole (integration). A measure of
integrated information, called phi (W), can be used to quantify the
information generated when a system is in a particular state of its
repertoire, above and beyond the information generated indepen-
dently by its parts [1].
The quality of integrated information
If the amount of integrated information generated by a system
can in principle account for changes in the level of consciousness,
what is responsible for the qualityofeachparticular experience? For
example, one can be aware of pure red on one instance, and of a
piercing sound on another instance. In both instances, one is aware
with roughly the same intensity – the quantity of consciousness is
similar – but the quality of the experience is radically different.
What determines that colors look the way they do, and different
from the way music sounds? And why do different cortical areas
seemingly contribute different qualities to experience? Why does
damage to certain parts of the cerebral cortex forever eliminates our
ability to experience color (whether perceived, imagined, remem-
bered or dreamt), whereas damage to other parts selectively
eliminates our ability to experience visual shapes?
The IIT claims that, just like the quantity of consciousness
generated by a complex of elements is determined by the amount
of integrated information it generates, the quality of consciousness
is determined by the set of informational relationships its
mechanisms generate [1]. Consider again the photodiode thought
experiment. When the photodiode reacts to light, it can only tell
that things are one way rather than another way. On the other
hand, when we see ‘‘light,’’ we discriminate against many more
states of affairs as a single entity, and thus generate much more
integrated information, i.e. consciousness. But what makes ‘‘light’’
light, and not some other conscious experience? The key is to
realize that the many discriminations we can do, and the
photodiode cannot, do not merely distinguish some particular
state against an undifferentiated bunch of equivalent alternatives,
but rather discriminate that state, in a specific way, against each
and every alternative.
Consider a very simple example: a binary counter capable of
discriminating among the 4 numbers: 00, 01, 10, 11. When the
counter says binary ‘‘3,’’ it is not just discriminating 11 from
everything else as an undifferentiated bunch; otherwise it would
not be a counter, but a 11 detector. To be a counter, the system
must be able to tell 11 apart from 00 as well as from 10 as well as
from 01 in different, specific ways. It does so, of course, by making
choices through its mechanisms, for example: is this the first or the
second digit? Is it a 0 or a 1? Each mechanism adds its specific
contribution to the discrimination they perform together.
Similarly, when we see light, mechanisms in our brain are not
just specifying ‘‘light’’ with respect to a bunch of undifferentiated
alternatives. Rather, these mechanisms are specifying that light is
what it is by virtue of being different, in this and that specific way,
from every other alternative. Thus, they specify at once that light is
different not only from dark, but also from any color, any shape,
any movie frame, any sound or smell, and so on, in every instance
in a very specific way. In this way, light acquires its specific meaning:
light as opposed to dark, not colored as opposed to colored (any
color), diffuse as opposed to having a particular shape (any
particular one), visual as opposed to auditory or olfactory, sensory
as opposed to thought-like, and so on. To us, then, light is much
more meaningful precisely because we have mechanisms that can
discriminate this particular state of affairs we call ‘‘light’’ against a
large number of alternatives.
By contrast, when the photodiode signals light, what does it
mean? The photodiode has no mechanism to discriminate colored
from achromatic light, even less to tell which particular color the
light might be. As a consequence, all light is the same to it, as long as
the intensity exceeds a certain threshold. So for the photodiode
‘‘light’’ cannot possibly mean achromatic as opposed to colored, not
to mention of which particular color. Also, the photodiode has no
mechanism to distinguish between a homogeneous light and a
brightshape – anybrightshape - onadarkerbackground.Soforthe
photodiode light cannot possibly mean full field as opposed to a
shape – any of countless particular shapes. Worse, the photodiode
Author Summary
In prior work, we suggested that consciousness has to do
with integrated information, which was defined as the
amount of information generated by a system in a given
state, above and beyond the information generated
independently by its parts. In the present paper, we move
from computing the quantity of integrated information to
describing the structure or quality of the integrated
information unfolded by interactions in the system. We
take a geometric approach, introducing the notion of a
quale as a shape that embodies the entire set of
informational relationships generated by interactions in
the system. The paper investigates how features of the
quale relate to properties of the underlying system and
also to basic features of experience, providing the
beginnings of a mathematical dictionary relating neuro-
physiology to the geometry of the quale and the geometry
to phenomenology.
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‘‘visualness’’ of light - as it has no mechanism to tell visual attributes,
such as light or dark, from non-visual ones, such as hot and cold,
light or heavy, loud or soft, and so on. As far as it knows, the
photodiode might just as well be a thermistor – it has no way of
knowing whether it is sensing light vs. dark or hot vs. cold.
In short, generating a large amount of integrated information
entails having a highly structured set of mechanisms that allow us
to make many nested discriminations (choices) as a single entity.
Each of the nested choices is an ‘‘informational relationship.’’
According to the IIT, these mechanisms working together
generate integrated information by specifying a set of informa-
tional relationships that completely and univocally determine the
quality of experience.
In the present paper, we set out to characterize mathematically
the set of informational relationships generated by a complex of
elements. First, we define qualia space (Q) as a space where each
point is a probability distribution on the possible states of the
system. The informational relationships can then be thought as
arrows between points in Q generated by causal mechanisms. We
then argue that each experience or quale corresponds to a
particular set of arrows linking points in Q, that is, an experience
is a shape in Q-space. We examine some of the properties of
qualia, including entanglement, concepts, and modes. Finally, we
show that the language of Q can capture, in principle, some of the
basic distinctions that can be made in our own phenomenology, as
well as some key neuropsychological observations. Hopefully, this
framework can help translate the seemingly ineffable qualitative
properties of phenomenology into the language of mathematics.
Model
In what follows, we consider isolated systems of binary elements,
idealizing the silence (0) and firing (1) of neurons. We further
assume that elements are memoryless (first order Markov
processes) and time passes in discrete instants (e.g. milliseconds).
These simplifying assumptions are not essential and will be relaxed
in further work. Elements are linked via directed connections and
respond to their inputs according to simple Boolean or
probabilistic functions, which together constitute the mechanism.
Notation. We refer to systems and subsets of systems by capital
letters: X, S and so forth. Uppercase letters with subscripts (X0,S 0)
denote probability distributions of perturbations that are physically
imposed on the outputs of a subset at a given time, e.g. at t=0.
Lowercase letters with subscripts (x1,s 1) denote events: the actual
output of the subset in question at a particular time, e.g. at t=1.
Integrated information
Before we deal with the quality of consciousness, we must deal
with its quantity. According to the IIT, the quantity of
consciousness associated with a complex of elements is given by
the amount of integrated information it generates [3]. We briefly
recall the framework presented in [3], introducing the notions of
effective information and integrated information.
Information. Consider the system in Fig. 1A, meant to
represent a binary photodiode. The system has a mechanism such
that if the sensor is on (S state=1), the detector turns on (D
state=1), and is currently in state [11]. How much information is
generated by system X, endowed with causal mechanism mech,
being in the particular state x1=(n
1
1n
2
1)=[1,1] at time t=1?
Prior to considering its mechanism and current state, the system of
two binary elements could have been in any of four possible states
([00],[01],[10],[11]) with equal probability p=J. This potential
repertoire (or ‘‘a priori repertoire’’, [3]) is the maximum entropy
(maxent or uniform) distribution, which entails maximum
ignorance [4], indicated with X0(maxH). The mechanism and
current state of the system, however, reduce uncertainty, i.e.
generate information, about the previous state of the system (at
t=0). This is because only some previous states (in this case, [10],
[11], with equal probability p=K) could have led to the current
system state x1 through the mechanism X0(mech), while previous
states [01],[00] could not (p=0). In general, mechanism and
current state specify an actual repertoire (or ‘‘a posteriori repertoire’’, [3])
or X0(mech,x1), the probability distribution expressing how
compatible previous system states are with the system’s
mechanism and current state. The effective information
generated by the system is the entropy of the actual repertoire
relative to the potential repertoire [3] (also known as Kullback-
Leibler divergence [5]):
ei X0 mech, x1 ðÞ ðÞ ~HX 0 mech, x1 ðÞ X0 maxH ðÞ k ½ 
In Fig. 1A, for example, the photodiode generates 1 bit of
effective information. Effective information is completely specified
the moment the mechanism and the state are specified. In
practice, it can be calculated by perturbing the system in all
possible ways [6] (all possible input states, corresponding to the
maximum entropy distribution or potential repertoire) while
keeping track of the resulting actual repertoire using Bayes’ rule.
Clearly, the amount of effective information generated by the
system is high if it has a large potential repertoire and a small
actual repertoire. By contrast, effective information is low if the
potential repertoire is small (small system) or if the actual
repertoire is close to the potential repertoire (for instance, the
mechanism is overwhelmed by noise, or many input states lead to
the same output states).
Integration. Of the information generated, how much is
generated by a single entity, as opposed to a collection of
independent parts? That is, how much of the information is
integrated information? Integrated information is measured by
comparing the actual repertoire generated by the system as a
whole with the combined actual repertoires generated
independently by the parts [3]. That is, the actual repertoire for
each part is specified by the mechanism internal to each part,
considered as a system in its own right, while external inputs are
treated as a source of extrinsic noise (Section 1 of Text S1). The
comparison is made with the particular decomposition of the
system into parts that leaves the least information unaccounted for,
called minimum information partition (MIP, see [3] for details).
Integrated information W(x1) is then the entropy of the actual
repertoire of the system relative to the product of actual repertoires
of its minimal parts M
k [3].
w x1 ðÞ ~HX 0 mech, x1 ðÞ P
Mk[MIP
Mk
0 mechk, mk
1

   

As an example, consider Fig. 1B, representing two of the million
photodiodes in a digital camera. By turning on or off depending on
its input, each photodiode generates 1 bit of information, just as we
saw before. Considered independently, 2 photodiodes generate 2
bits of information, and 1 million photodiodes generate 1 million
bits of information. However, as shown in the figure, the product
of the actual distributions generated independently by the parts is
identical to the actual distribution for the system as a whole.
Therefore, the relative entropy between the two distributions is
Qualia: The Geometry of Integrated Information
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 3 August 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | e1000462Figure 1. Effective information. (A): A ‘‘photodiode’’ consisting of a sensor and detector unit; the detector unit fires. For the entire system of two
units there are four possible states: 00, 10, 01 and 11. The potential repertoire X0(maxH) is the maximum entropy distribution on the four states. If the
detector fires, its mechanism specifies that the sensor fired at time zero, thus ruling out 2 of the 4 possible states of the system, the actual repertoire
is X0(mech,x1)=(0,0,K,K) on the four states. The prior state of the detector makes no difference to the current state of the system, so the states 01
and 11 are indistinguishable to the mechanism. Relative entropy (also known as Kullback-Leibler divergence) between two probability distributions p
and q is H[pIq]=S pi log2(pi/qi), so that effective information (entropy of the actual repertoire relative to the potential) is 1 bit. Integrated
information. Left-hand side: two double-couples. (B): the system as a whole generates 4 bits of effective information by specifying that elements n
2
and n
3 were on at time t=0. (CD): The information generated by the system as a whole is completely accounted for by the parts, taken
independently. The minimum information partition (MIP) is the decomposition of the system into those (minimal) parts that leave the least
information unaccounted for. (E): the actual repertoire of the whole is identical to the combined actual repertoires of the parts (the product of their
respective probability distributions), so that relative entropy is zero. The system generates no information above and beyond the parts, so it cannot
be considered a single entity. Right-hand side: an integrated system. Elements in the system are ON if they receive 2 or more spikes. The system enters
state x1=1000. (B9): the mechanism specifies a unique prior state that causes (leads to) state x1, so the system generates 4 bits of effective
information. All other perturbations are ruled out since they cause different outputs. (C9D9): effective information generated by the two minimal
parts, considered as systems in their own right. External inputs (dotted black arrows) are treated as extrinsic noise. (E9): the information generated by
the whole (cyan arrows) over and above the parts (purple arrows). This is computed as the entropy of the actual repertoire of the whole relative to
the combined actual repertoires of the parts: W(x1)=2 bits. The system generates information above and beyond its parts, so it can be considered a
single entity (a complex).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g001
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above and beyond what is generated by its parts.
Clearly, for integrated information to be high, a system must be
connected in such a way that information is generated by causal
interactions among rather than within its parts. Thus, a system can
generate integrated information only to the extent that it cannot
be decomposed into informationally independent parts. A simple
example of such a system is shown in Fig. 1B9. In this case, the
interaction between the minimal parts of the system generates
information above and beyond what is accounted for by the parts
by themselves, and W(x1)=2 bits.
In short, integrated information captures the information
generated by causal interactions in the whole, over and above
the information generated independently by the parts. If a system
of elements in state x1 generates integrated information W.0 and
is not contained in some larger set with strictly higher W it is called
a complex (a main complex if its subsets have strictly lower W).
Indeed, only a complex can be properly considered to form a
single entity and thus to generate integrated information.
Qualia space and qualia
To deal with the quality of consciousness, we must consider how
the mechanism of a complex specifies an actual repertoire by
discriminating a given state (say ‘‘light’’) not against an
undifferentiated bunch of equivalent alternatives, but rather by
discriminating that state, in a specific way, against each and every
alternative. To do so, we must introduce some tools that serve to
characterize the set of informational relationships generated by the
mechanism of a complex (Fig. 2).
The set of connections Conn. The mechanism of a complex
is captured by the set of connections Conn among its elements and
the rules implemented by the elements. Notation c
ij refers to a
connection in X from element n
i to n
j. Elements are assumed to
implement Boolean or probabilistic functions. A connection
between two elements is the minimal meaningful unit of interac-
tion in a system, but connections can mediate interactions among
subsets of elements. The system in Fig. 2A (same as in Fig. 1 B9)
has 4 elements, and 9 connections among them. A subset m ,
Conn is referred to as a submechanism of the system, see Section 1 of
Figure 2. The lattice L of combinations of submechanisms within a system of 4 elements. (A): A system X of 4 elements and 9 connections.
(B): Connections in the system are grouped into 4 submechanisms {m
1,m
2,m
3,m
4} contained within Conn, the set of all connections in X. (C): The
lattice of combinations of the 4 submechanisms. (D): The union of submechanisms m
1 and m
2 is submechanism m
12. (E): The intersection of
submechanisms m
123 and m
124 is submechanism m
12. (F): The complement of submechanism m
12 is \]m
12=m
34. (G): A q-edge is a path from the
bottom of the lattice to the top, constructed by engaging each submechanism in sequence. (H): The q-fold generated by all q-arrows of the form
rRr<m
1, for different contexts r. (I): The down-set Q{m
1,m
2} and the dual up-set q\]{m
1,m
2}.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g002
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on a page), the 9 connections are subdivided into 4 basic
submechanisms, Conn=[m
1,m
2,m
3,m
4], Fig. 2B.
The lattice L. The set of all submechanisms of the system, the
powerset of Conn, is denoted as the lattice L(X), which conveniently
captures all possible combinations of causal interactions within X
(Fig. 2C). A lattice is a bookkeeping structure that can be used to
keep track of inclusion relations, see [7,8] or Section 2 of Text S1.
The bottom of the lattice (H) is the null set Ø, which contains no
connections. The top of the lattice (T) contains all connections
(hence, T=Conn). Going up the lattice, one encounters all
submechanisms: all combinations (subsets) of connections.
The lattice is endowed with three operations: union, intersection
and inclusion. Given two members m and r of L, we can form the
union s=m<r (the smallest whole containing both, Fig. 2D) and
the intersection m>r (the largest part contained in both groups,
Fig. 2D). Inclusion of subsets of connections into larger subsets of
connections induces a partial ordering on L: if m , s, then draw
an arrow m R s. Each subset m of Conn has a unique complement
\]m=Conn\m containing all connections not in m (Fig. 2F).
Fig. 2G shows an edge in the lattice, which represents a particular
path from the bottom to the top. One starts with no connections
(bottom), then adds a first submechanism, then two, then three,
and finally all of them. Note, this does not correspond to travelling
through the network over time.
Fig. 2H shows a fold. Each cyan arrow is drawn when adding
submechanism m
1 in different contexts. For example, the lowest
cyan arrow is drawn when considering adding submechanism m
1
in the null context, corresponding to the bottom of the lattice. The
next cyan arrow is drawn when considering submechanism m
1
added in the context of submechanism m
2. The highest cyan
arrow is drawn when considering submechanism m
1 added in the
full context, corresponding to all the other connections together
({m
2,m
3,m
4}=\]{m
1}), which is where it reaches the top of the
lattice. The union of all arrows drawn when adding a particular
connection (or submechanism) in all contexts defines the
corresponding fold. Thus, all the cyan arrows in Fig. 2H constitute
the fold of submechanism m
1.
Finally, given any subset r of Conn, we can construct two
sublattices: the down-set Qr of all subsets included in r, and the
up-set qr of all subsets that include r (Fig. 2I).
The actual repertoire specified by a submechan-
ism. Each submechanism m of X discriminates between
potential prior states, distinguishing those that cause (lead to)
state x1 from those that do not. The discrimination performed by m
is explicitly described as the actual repertoire X0(m,x1) specified by
that submechanism. The actual repertoire is computed by
perturbing the system with states in the potential repertoire
while using Bayes’ rule to keep track of perturbations that cause
(lead to) the current state x1. Connections not in m are treated as
extrinsic noise and are independently averaged over with the
maxent distribution (see Section 1 of Text S1). The empty
submechanism H, with all connections disengaged, rules out no
alternatives and specifies the potential repertoire X0(maxH).
Qualia space Q is a 2
n dimensional space (for a system of n binary
elements and 2
n possible states), having an axis per state and
coordinates corresponding to the probability of each state; the
space of probability distributions in Q is studied in information
geometry [9]. Each submechanism m maps to the point in Q given
by actual repertoire X0(m,x1). Fig. 3A shows the mapping of the
lattice L into Q for the system shown in Fig. 1B9. Since a 16-
dimensional repertoire cannot be drawn, we resort to a 2-
dimensional representation of the 16 axes corresponding to the 16
possible states of the system of 4 elements.
Informational relationships (q-arrows) represent the ‘‘differences that
make a difference’’ [10] to the system, specifically: how discrimina-
tions performed by pairs mRm<r of submechanisms differ (where
one submechanism is included in the other). Formally, this intuition
is captured as an informational relationship (q-arrow) between two
repertoires X0(m,x1)RX0(m<r,x1) in the quale. Informational
relationships have counterparts in semantics [11,12], see Section 5
of Text S1. The ‘‘length’’ (divergence) of the q-arrow expresses the
magnitude of the difference between the discriminations performed
by the two submechanisms, i.e. the effective information sub-
mechanism r generates in the context given by submechanism m.A s
before, effective information is the relative entropy between the two
repertoires: ei(X0(m,x1)RX0(m<r,x1))=H[X0(m<r,x1)IX0(m,x1)].
One canfurtherresolve an informational relationshipbyconsidering
its internal structure: the shape of sub-lattice qm>Q(m<r)
containing all submechanisms between m and m<r, see Section 5
of Text S1. In general, the more connections one engages, the more
the actual repertoire will differ from the potential repertoire. The
entire system (all connections in the complex) specifies the actual
repertoire X0(T,x1), which constitutes the top of the quale. In Fig. 3B
this corresponds to a point projecting to p=1 on one axis and p=0
on the remaining axes.
The quale Q(mech,x1) is the mapping of the repertoires generated
by all the submechanisms of a complex X into Q; it geometrically
unfolds the quality (structure) of the information generated by X.
Points of the quale are given by the set of actual repertoires and
represent the discriminations made by every submechanism of X.
Informational relationships (q-arrows) capture the discrimination
performed by a submechanism in the context of other sub-
mechanisms (the effective information matrix [1]). The quale can
be visualized as a kind of 2
n-dimensional polytope; its shape
completely characterizes how the system’s mechanism generates
information by ruling out alternatives when it enters state x1.
Note. The quale generated by even a small system is high
dimensional, and contains a large number of repertoires and
informational relationships. Further, it has a non-metric geometry:
effective information (Kullback-Leibler divergence) is not a measure
oflength.Itfollowsthatthequalecannotbeaccuratelyrepresentedon
a flat page. The figures that follow are not ‘‘to scale’’. Instead, we
relate geometric features of interest to important properties of the
system and show how they can be quantified.
The quale shows a certain resemblance to graphical models [13–
15], though there are important differences (see Section 2 of Text S1
for details). A key difference is that in graphical models nodes
represent random variables standing for concepts that are taken as
given (e.g. RAIN, DANGER) and edges represent conditional
dependencies between the given concepts (e.g. p(DANGER|RAIN)).
By contrast, in the quale the mechanism and state x1 are taken as
given. Each point is a perspective provided by a submechanism on
the causal interactions that have occurred, and the q-arrows represent
how perspectives differ from their subperspectives. A natural question
is: How do concepts arise? To answer we must first introduce the
notion of entanglement.
Entanglement
A fundamental property of q-arrows is their entanglement (c):
the extent to which an informational relationship does not reduce
to its component relationships (sub-q-arrows). A q-arrow is tangled
(c.0) if its sub-q-qarrows generate information differently taken
together than they do taken separately (note the analogy with W).
As will be described below, entanglement is used to characterize
concepts and modes.
Fig. 4A shows a tangled informational relationship generated
by a silent AND-gate. The mechanism of the system, given by
Qualia: The Geometry of Integrated Information
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13,c
23}, rules out the prior state [n
1n
2]=[11]. As shown in
Fig. 4B, the q-arrow X0(maxH)RX0(T,x1) specified by T cannot
be reduced to the q-arrows specified by {c
12} and {c
13} separately,
since the actual repertoire X0(T,x1) does not reduce to the product
of actual repertoires specified by submechanisms {c
13} and {c
23}
separately. If the sub-q-arrows were not tangled the q-arrow
X0(maxH)RX0(T,x1) would reduce to the diagonal of the
parallelogram obtained by considering elements n
1 and n
2
separately. That is, unentangled q-arrows are orthogonal to each
other; while entanglement ‘‘warps’’ the shape of the quale away
from a simple parallelogram, see Section 4 of Text S1.
Entanglement c of q-arrow X0(m,x1)RX0(m<r,x1) is the entropy
of repertoire X0(m<r,x1) relative to the natural decomposition of
the q-arrow:
c X0 m,x1 ðÞ ?X0 m|r,x1 ðÞ ðÞ
~HX 0 m|r,x1 ðÞ P
Mk[MIPc
Mk
0 m|rk,x1

   

,
where MIPc is the minimum information partition for entangle-
ment, by analogy with the formula for W. The set r
k contains the q-
arrows in r outgoing from M
k. Thus, entanglement captures how
much information a q-arrow generates over and above its natural
decomposition into its minimal q-arrows. Entanglement of a q-arrow
is zero if and only if it decomposes into a collection of independent
component q-arrows. The minimum information partition for entan-
glement is found by computing
MIPc~argmin
2
c X0 m, x1 ðÞ ?X0 m|r, x1 ðÞ =2 ðÞ
N2

,
where entanglement for an arbitrary partition is
c X0 m,x1 ðÞ ?X0 m|r,x1 ðÞ =2 ðÞ
~HX 0 m|r,x1 ðÞ P
Mk[2
Mk
0 m|rk,x1

   

:
Let R
k=src(r
k) be the source elements for the connections in s
k.
Similar to W, the normalization N2 for partition P is
N2~ l{1 ðÞ min
k
Hmax Rk
0
 	
where l is the number of parts for which S
k?Ø. More details on
entanglement are provided in Section 4 of Text S1.
A concept X0(m,x1)RX0(m<r,x1) is an indivisible informational
relationship (c.0). In other words, a concept is a discrimination
performed by some mechanism r in context m that cannot be
decomposed into a product of simpler discriminations because the
information generated by its constituent sub-q-arrows rely on each
other for context. By contrast, a q-arrow with c=0 has not
internal contextual dependencies, and reduces to its sub-q-arrows
without any loss of information. The notion of concept is graded.
Figure 3. A quale. (A): Qualia space for a system of 4 elements is 16-dimensional (with an axis for each of the 2
4 possible states of the complex); the
axes are flattened onto the page. Upon entering state x1=1000, the complex generates a quale or shape in Q-space. The quale is generated as
follows. The maximum entropy potential repertoire (the ‘‘bottom’’ of the quale) is a point assigning equal probability to all states. Engaging a
submechanism (in this case the pair of connections r={c
12,c
21}) ‘‘sharpens’’ the maximum entropy distribution into an actual repertoire, which is
another point in Q-space. The q-arrow linking the two distributions (without and with r engaged) geometrically realizes the informational relationship
specified by the connections in r. The ‘‘length’’ (divergence) of the q-arrow expresses how much the connection sharpens the distribution (the
effective information it generates or relative entropy between the two distributions); the direction in Q-space expresses the particular way in which
the connection sharpens the distribution. (B): Adding additional connections further sharpens the actual repertoire, specifying new points in Q-space
and the corresponding q-arrows. The figure shows 16 out of the 399 points in the quale; those generated by combinations of the 4 submechanisms
progressively engaged in the insets. The insets around the quale show the repertoires generated along two q-edges (starting at the bottom left,
going clockwise and anti-clockwise respectively) formed by q-arrows that engage the 4 sets of connections in two different orders (pink arrows are
connections that are engaged; black arrows are connections that have already been engaged in the q-edge). Cyan bars represent probabilities
assigned to the 16 possible prior states. Together, the q-edges enclose a shape, the quale, which completely specifies the quality of the experience.
Effective information (in bits) of q-arrows in the q-edge is shown alongside.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g003
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interdependent; for example, a few connections in a system,
chosen at random, will (typically) not be tangled.
The simplest concepts are generated by individual connections,
which are literally indivisible. The silent AND-gate in Fig. 4A
constitutes a simple higher-order concept. Taken separately, the two
connection into the silent AND gate generates the elementary
concepts {probably not n
1} and {probably not n
2} ,s i n c ei ne a c hc a s e
maxent noise has been introduced on the other connection. Taken
together, however, they tangle and generate the indivisible concept
{notboth}. The concept {not both}does notreduce tothe productof
the elementary concepts {probably not n
1} and {probability not n
2},
Fig. 4B. Contrast the silent AND gate with the system in Fig. 4C,
where elements n
4 and n
5 implement the operation NOISY COPY, i.e.
have the same mechanism as an AND gate in which one input
connection is given extrinsic noise. The informational relationship
generated by c
45 is the concept {probably not n
4}, and similarly for
c
54 {probably not n
5}. In this case, however, the q-arrow generated
by both {c
45,c
54}i sn o tt a n g l e d( c=0) as it decomposes into a
product of the two smaller, independent q-arrows (Fig. 4D).Thus, the
resulting q-arrow means {probably not n
4 or n
5}. As such, it does not
constitute a single concept, but merely the product of the two
independent sub-concepts, and its contribution the quale reduces to
that of its components.
A mode is a q-arrow that is more densely tangled than its
surrounding q-arrows; modes are informational relationships
constituting distinct ‘‘sub-shapes’’ in Q. Modes are defined
analogously to complexes. Formally, a mode is a maximally dense
concept: a mode is an up-set of \]a, X0(\]a,x1)RX0(mech,x1), with
c(X0(\]a,x1)RX0(mech,x1)).0 that is not contained in some larger
up-set of \]b, which is (strictly) more densely tangled:
c X0 :b, x1 ðÞ ?X0 T, x1 ðÞ ðÞ
Hmax B0 ðÞ
v
c X0 :a, x1 ðÞ ?X0 T, x1 ðÞ ðÞ
Hmax A0 ðÞ
for all b[a, where A0 contains the source elements in a, and
similarly for b. As will be discussed below, modes play an
important role in understanding the structure of experience,
especially modalities and submodalities. If a mode is contained
within a larger mode, we refer to it as a sub-mode. By analogy with a
main complex, an elementary mode is such that its component q-
arrows have strictly lower c.
Fig. 5A shows a system containing an AND and COPY gate. The
AND-gate tangles two of the connections in the quale, forming the
pink shape in panel B: the concept {not both}. Similarly, the
COPY-gate generates the concept {not this}. The system as a
whole does not generate a single concept, but rather two distinct
concepts. This can be seen in panel C where the system as a whole
Figure 4. Entanglement. (A): A silent AND-gate. (B): The quale generated by the system (maroon arrows). Notice that connections c
13 and c
23
generate more information in the full context (.33 bits at the top of the quale) than in the null context (.08 at the bottom). The actual repertoires
generated by submechanisms of the system are shown alongside in cyan. Repertoire X0({c
13},x1) assigns probability 2/3 to states where n
1 was silent
and 1/3 to states where it was not: the concept ‘‘n
1 probably did not fire’’. The actual repertoire of the whole, X0({c
13,c
23},x1), specifies ‘‘n
1 and n
2 did
not both fire’’, which cannot be recovered from the concepts generated by the two connections taken singly. Entanglement is computed by
measuring the entropy of the actual repertoire of the whole relative to the product of the repertoires generated by the two connections singly,
shown in gray. (C): A system of three elements, two of which implement the operation NOISY COPY: element n
1 spikes with p=0 if it receives silent
input, and p=K if it receives a spike; this is the same operation performed by an AND-gate when one of its wires is treated as noise. (D): By
construction, the informational relationships generated by connections c
45 and c
54 in the null context is the same as connections c
13 and c
23 in panel
B. However, the qualia generated by the AND-gate and NOISY-COPY system differ because of how the informational relationships tangle at the top of
the qualia; an AND-gate is not simply the combination of two NOISY COPY gates, as can be seen by comparing panels B and D. In the disentangled
system, panel D, the actual repertoire of the whole coincides with a product of marginalizations of the actual repertoires of the individual
connections.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g004
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concepts are orthogonal to one another and do not interact. Since
the concept {not both} is not contained in a larger, more densely
tangled concept, it forms a mode.
Results and Discussion
In what follows, we examine some general properties of qualia,
and some implications of considering an experience as a shape in
qualia space. We also examine how considering basic neurophys-
iological notions in terms of qualia space affects their interpreta-
tion. We then consider some consequences of entanglement and
the meaning of concepts, and how learning new concepts affects
qualia space. We consider basic examples of how different aspects
of phenomenology may be classified as different basic shapes in
qualia space, and how, if experiences are shapes in qualia space,
they can be compared just as shapes can be. Finally, we consider
how a paradigmatic quale, such as ‘‘seeing red,’’ can be thought of
in the present framework, with relevant implications for
neuropsychology.
For computational reasons, as in [3], we measure integrated
information (W) and entanglement (c) by considering all biparti-
tions and the total partition, instead of all partitions. Further, when
measuring entanglement we restrict attention to submechanisms
given by connections sourcing from particular elements (rather
than arbitrary groups of connections) and measure the entangle-
ment of the bits in those source elements.
Some general properties of qualia
We first consider some basic results that can be obtained by
treating qualia as shapes specified by sets of informational
relationships. We show that the amount of integrated information
generated by a complex can be interpreted as the ‘‘height’’ of the
quale. It also follows that only informational relationships
generated within a complex contribute to the shape of the
corresponding quale. Another consequence is that the state of a
complex is meaningless without considering its mechanism. An
intriguing corollary is that different systems in different states may
generate exactly the same quale.
The quantity of consciousness (W) is the ‘‘height’’ of the
quale. How does the shape of the quale Q(mech,x1) reflect the
integrated information W(x1) generated by a system? To address
this question, one must consider how partitions, including the
minimum information partition (MIP), can be represented in
qualia space. Recall that each submechanism specifies an actual
repertoire by discriminating between potential prior states. Actual
repertoire X0(m,x1) can be interpreted as that submechanism’s
perspective on the discriminations performed by the entire system.
Each partition is just a point in Q; for example, suppose we have a
partition P. For each part M
k in P, let the intra-set of M
k be all
connections for which the source and the target are elements in
M
k. Let P , Conn (we reuse the symbol) be the union of the intra-
sets across the parts in P (the partition): it contains all connections
within each part, and no connections between parts. In this way
partitions are mapped into L(X):
X0 P,x1 ðÞ ~P
k
Mk
0 mechk,mk
1

so that ei X0 P,x1 ðÞ ðÞ ~ei X0?x1=P ðÞ ,
where the right-hand side of each equation uses the notation of
[3]. Given partition P, define the extra-set of P to be connections
between parts, thus the extra-set of P is the complement \]P.
Effective information ei(X0(P,x1)) is then the information
generated by the extra-set of P (since mech=T=P<\]P), over
and above the intra-set of P. The relations between partition-
repertoires inside Q geometrically realize the interactions amongst
parts that are performed by the various extra-sets of connections in
X. The additional points in Q given by other submechanisms
reveal the finer structure of the discriminations performed by the
system.
The minimum information partition (MIP) is thus just another
point in Q, the one specified by the connections within the
minimal parts only. The q-arrow X0(P
MIP,x1)RX0(T,x1) has
divergence:
w x1 ðÞ ~HX 0 T, x1 ðÞ X0 PMIP, x1
   

Therefore, W quantifies the difference between the perspective
provided by the entire system and that provided by the MIP, the
partition that most closely accounts for the perspective of the whole.
For this reason the down-set QP
MIP, which unfolds the structure
Figure 5. Modes. A mode is a maximally densely tangled q-arrow at the top of the quale. (A): A system containing an AND and COPY gate. (B): The
quale generated by X. Connections c
13 and c
23 are tangled at the top of the quale with c=.25 bits. (C): The system as a whole is not tangled:
entanglement between connection c
32 and connections {c
13,c
23} is zero. Thus, the up-set q\]{c
13,c
23} is a mode: it is not contained in a larger up-set
with higher c. (D) Cartoon of a hierarchy of modes in a complex quale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g005
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of the system’s natural information-theoretic ‘‘base’’. The W-q-
arrow can then be thought of as the height of the solid, quantifying
how much the complex rises above a collection of independent
parts. Fig. 6A shows the quale generated by the integrated system
of Fig. 2B and 3B (in state 1000). In the figure, the quale has been
rotated to rest on this base. In general, the higher the W value of a
complex, the more ‘‘breathing room’’ there is for the various
informational relationships within the complex (the edges of the
solid) to express themselves. Alternative geometric methods for
decomposing a probability distribution into orthogonal compo-
nents are developed in [16–18]; see Section 3 of Text S1 for a
comparison of the approaches and their motivations.
Consider now Fig. 6B. For the double couple of Fig. 2A, which
is clearly made up of two disjoint complexes, the entire quale
collapses onto sublattice QP
MIP: the actual repertoire of the whole
collapses onto its base (MIP), and W is zero. The solid is flat:
looking at the quale from the natural perspective, level with the
ground, nothing is visible. The perspective provided by the MIP
completely accounts for the discriminations performed by the
system. Indeed, there exists no complex corresponding to the
double couple – as a whole, such a system does not generate any
quantity of consciousness (measured by integrated information, W),
nor any quality (measured by the shape of the quale Q).
Informationally, and phenomenologically, it does not exist. What
exists, instead, are two smaller complexes, each corresponding to a
couple of elements joined by a mechanism - for example, two
separate photodiodes. Each of them generates a small quale,
corresponding to a single q-arrow with no further structure.
The systems shown in Fig. 6AB are idealized examples of an
integrated and a strongly modular system respectively. Prior work
[3] has shown that modular systems – such as the cerebellum –
typically generate low W. Although we cannot draw the qualia of
large modular systems, the figure shows how the quale of a system
with low W lies low on its base, which is given by the partition into
near-independent modules. As a system becomes more function-
ally integrated, whilst remaining functionally specialized, W
increases as the system becomes less a collection of independent
parts, and more a single entity.
Only informational relationships within a complex are
part of the same quale. If experience is integrated information
within a complex, it follows that only the informational
relationships within a complex contribute to experience [1].
Conversely, the informational relationships that exist outside a
main complex – for example those generated in a separate
complex, or those involving sensory afferents or cortico-subcortical
loops implementing informationally insulated subroutines [1] –
cannot contribute either to the quantity or to the quality of
consciousness generated by the main complex. As illustrated in
Fig. 6B, though one may attempt to draw the quale generated by a
collection of n=4 elements forming two separate complexes in the
full 2
n=16 dimensional qualia space, it turns out, upon closer
inspection, that its shape does not exist in the full-dimensional
space (the solid is flat). Rather, the shape collapses into two simpler
qualia living in lower-dimensional qualia spaces (2
2=4-
dimensional), one per complex. In the case of overlapping
complexes, informational relationships specified by the same
mechanism may live in different qualia, a higher–dimensional one
corresponding to the main complex, and a lower–dimensional one
corresponding to a larger complex of lower W. In summary, only
the informational relationships within a complex contribute to
giving the quale its shape.
The same system in different states may generate
different qualia. When the same system (mechanism) is in a
different state (firing pattern), it will typically generate a different
quale or shape, even for the same value of W. Figure 7AB show the
Figure 6. The relationship between qualia and W. (A): The quale generated by the system in Fig. 3. The down-set QMIP of the minimum
information partition forms a natural ‘‘base’’ for the complex. The informational relationships among the parts are built on top of the informational
relationships generated within the minimal parts. From this perspective the W q-arrow (in black) represents the ‘‘height’’ of the quale above its base;
the ‘‘length’’ (divergence) of the W-q-arrow expresses the breathing room in the system. (B): The quale generated by the pair of couples in Fig. 1B.
Although the system generates the same amount of effective information and the same actual repertoire (as a whole) as the system in panel A, it
does not do so as a single entity. The system breaks into two independent components (the down-set QMIP contains the entire quale). The system
reduces to its MIP (base); integrated information W=0 so there is no breathing room and no experience is generated. The system breaks into two
disjoint components, each of which forms a complex with W.0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g006
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(x1=001,100). Since the connections are engaged in different ways
when the system is in two different states, the interactions within
the systems are qualitatively different. As shown in Fig. 6, systems
sharing the same actual repertoire as a whole may also generate
different qualia since their submechanisms generate information
differently.
Different systems in the same state may generate
different qualia. A quale is specified by a mechanism and a
particular state - it does not make sense to ask about the quale
generated by a mechanism in isolation, or by a state (firing pattern)
in isolation. A consequence is that different systems in the same
state can generate different qualia. Fig. 7BC shows two systems,
the AND/XOR system and the PARITY/XOR system. The two
systems are in the same state (x1=100); and both generate W=3
bits; in both cases the minimum information partition is the total
partition (MIP=123|Ø). However, the two systems differ both in
their connectivity and in the rules that the elements implement, so
the quale generated by the AND/XOR-triple is structured
differently from the PARITY/XOR-system. As an extreme
example, a system that were to copy one by one the state of the
neurons in a human brain, but had no internal connections of its
own, would generate no consciousness and no quale [1,3]. Thus,
the notion of state is meaningless without taking into account the
mechanism that produces the state.
Different systems in different states may generate the
same quale. By the same token, it is possible that two different
systems generate the same quale. As an example, consider again the
photodiode, whose mechanism determines that if the current in the
sensor exceed a threshold, the detector turns on. Informationally,
the photodiode implements a COPY system, where the detector
copies the state of the sensor. This simple causal interaction is all
there is, and when the photodiode turns on it merely specifies an
actual repertoire where states (x1=00,01,10,11) have, respectively,
probability (0,0,K,K) (Fig. 8A). Thiscorresponds inQ toa single q-
arrow, one bit long, going from the potential, maximum entropy
repertoire (J,J,J,J) to (0,0,K,K). Now imagine the light sensor
is substituted by a temperature sensor with the same threshold and
dynamic range - we have a thermistor rather than a photodiode,
and assume that the detector is off (low temperature, Fig. 8B). While
the physical device has changed, and its state is different, according
to the IIT the experience, minimal as it is, has to be the same, since
the informational relationship that is generated by the two devices is
identical.
Qualia isomorphism. The symbols 0 (off) and 1 (on) are
arbitrary labels given to interchangeable outputs. In fact, there is
an isomorphism between the two qualia: the reflection in Fig. 8C
relabels the outputs of n
1, flipping 1 and 0. Thus, a binary device
like a photodiode or a thermistor generates the same qualia
regardless of the state it is in; the two qualia are equivalent. The
system is memoryless, so every input is a surprise (even if they are
all the same); to be a binary photodiode or thermistor is to rule two
out of four potential states at each instant. As can be seen from the
quale, there is no additional structure to the system. An
isomorphism between two qualia is an identification of the
qualia spaces, Q(X) and Q(Y), by relabeling elements and outputs,
that induces a lattice isomorphism from Q(x1) onto Q(y1). A lattice
isomorphism is a bijection preserving the lattice structure, see
Section 2 of Text S1.
As another example, consider the qualia generated by a silent
AND-gate and by a firing OR-gate (Fig. 8DE). Comparing panel D
withpanel E, it is apparent that relabelingthe outputs of the top two
elementsproducesanisomorphismbetweenthequaliageneratedby
a silent AND-gate and a firing OR-gate (it is easy to show that the
converse is also true: the qualia generated by a firing AND-gate and
a silent OR-gate are isomorphic). Thus, in simple systems it is
possible that symmetries and isomorphisms may lead to different
physical systems generating the same quale [19]. As a consequence,
to be a silent AND-gate is indistinguishable from being a silent OR-
gate; similarly, to be a COPY-system, in any state, is indistinguish-
able from being a NOT-system, in any state (symmetries in a more
interesting example, the AND-triple, and in a parity system, are
analyzed in Section 7 of Text S1). It should be kept in mind,
however, that in more complicated systems symmetries are likely to
break. Thus, it is extremely unlikely that two different biological
systems would generate identical experiences.
Figure 7. The quale depends on the mechanism and the state. (AB): The same system (an AND-gate and two XOR-gates) in two different
states generates two different qualia, two different experiences. (BC): Two systems in the same state, but with different mechanisms, generate
different qualia.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g007
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Considering the information generated by a complex of
elements in terms of the shape they specify in Q has some
implications for the way we interpret neurophysiologic data.
Rather than trying to understand the meaning of the activity of
some elements (neurons) in isolation, or even of distributed
patterns of activity or of correlations, the IIT claims that meaning
is only generated in terms of shapes in Q, that is, in terms of the set
of informational relationships generated by a complex. Below we
examine a few representative examples that clarify the perspective
provided by the IIT. For instance, we show that, in Q, the same
connections can specify different informational relationships in
different contexts. Next, we show that removing a set of
connections (mimicking a lesion) simplifies the shape of the quale
by collapsing it along a q-fold. We also illustrate how, when an
element (a neuron) turns on, it generates information by changing
the shape of the quale. Moreover, informational relationships, and
thus the shape of the quale, are specified both by the elements that
are firing and by those that are not. Finally, ‘‘inactivating’’
elements that are already inactive has major consequences on the
shape of the quale, though the firing pattern remains the same.
The same mechanism can generate different infor-
mational relationships in different contexts. Informational
relationships are context-dependent, in the following sense. Recall
from the Model section that a context is a point in the lattice L
corresponding to a particular submechanism m. In Q, this point
corresponds to the actual repertoire generated by that
submechanism. As shown in Fig. 9A, the q-arrow generated by
a connection (how it further sharpens the actual repertoire) can
change in both magnitude and direction depending on the
context. In Fig. 9A, when considered in isolation (null context), the
connection r between elements 1 and 2 generates a q-arrow of 1.1
bits pointing in a certain direction. When considered in the full
context provided by all other connections (\]r), the same
Figure 8. Isomorphisms between qualia. (A): The simplest possible system: a sensor and a detector, where the detector copies the prior state of
the sensor. The quale generated by the system when the detector is ON is a single q-arrow with effective information of 1 bit. The q-arrow specifies
the sensor was ON in the previous time step. (B) When the detector is OFF, the system generates a different quale, where the q-arrow points in a
different direction – towards a different actual repertoire – specifying that the detector was OFF. Effective information is again 1 bit. (C): A reflection
of Q-space generated by relabeling the outputs of n
1 (flipping 0 and 1) induces an isomorphism between the two qualia. (DE): The qualia generated
by a silent AND-gate and a firing OR-gate respectively. The two qualia are isomorphic, which can be seen by flipping the roles of 0 and 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g008
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different direction. Another example is shown in Fig. 9B, a system
of 8 AND-gates. The four cyan elements generate 1.5 bits of
information in the null context and 4 bits of information in the full
context, and the informational relationships point in different
directions. Panels CDEF show results averaged across many
different states of the same system, for different submechanisms.
The results show that the information generated by a set of
connections is higher in the full context than in the null context
when a system generates high W. Thus, within an integrated
system, a submechanism produces different informational effects
in different contexts, and usually it produces larger effects the
richer the context. Note that this result is fully compatible with
empirical work on functional connectivity [20] and related
theoretical considerations [21,22] on the role of neural context
in cognition.
Lesioning a mechanism collapses a quale along a q-
fold. Removing a set of connections from every possible context
folds a quale. As shown in Fig. 10, if we remove the submechanism
r from the system (same as in Fig. 3), all the q-arrows generated by
that connection, in all possible contexts, vanish, so the shape of the
quale ‘‘folds’’ (collapses) along the dimensions specified by that
connection. Conversely, when the connection is added to a system,
the shape of the quale unfolds. Thus, within an integrated system, a
Figure 9. Context-dependency of informational relationships. (A): The same set of connections engaged in two different contexts (red
arrows) for the system in Fig. 3. At the bottom of the quale (in the null context) the connections generate 1.1 bits of information, whereas the up-set
of the connections, in the full context, generates 1.8 bits of information. (B): A system of AND-gates. The four cyan elements generate 1.5 bits of
information in the null context and 4 bits of information in the full context. (CDEF): The relationship between W and context-dependence. Each panel
shows a system of 8 AND-gates with two sets of connections chosen, shown in red and cyan (in panel E a connection is chosen twice). Each point in
the graphs shows the average value of the difference: ‘‘r in full context – r in null context’’=ei(X0(\]r,x1)RX0(T,x1))2ei(X0(maxH)RX0(r,x1)), averaged
across network states where W is in the range [k,k+0.5), as k varies from 0 to 3.5 bits. The graphs show that, context as W increases, the information
generated by a set of connections in the full context increases relative to the same connections in the null.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g009
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contexts, and these effects can be captured precisely by changes
in the shape of the quale along a fold.
When an element within a complex becomes active, it
changes the shape of the quale. In neurophysiology, one
often searches for neurons that fire for particular inputs. It is often
assumed that, when such neurons fire, they ‘‘broadcast’’ the
relevant information to a large public of other neurons [23].
However, it is hard to see how the firing of a neuron may convey
the meaning of those inputs, when all it can do is fire or not. A
similar problem obtains for the neuron receiving its output. Each
of them may receive up to 10,000 input lines, some firing, some
not. How is a target neuron going to know that one of its input
spikes means ‘‘red’’ or a particular shape? According to the IIT,
what matters is that, within a complex, the firing of a neuron that
was previously off changes the shape of the entire quale, which is
what carries the meaning. As a simple example, consider the
complex in Fig. 11 (same as in Fig. 3). Assume, for instance, that
element n
1 stands for a neuron selective for a ‘‘square’’ shape,
which is currently firing due to the presence of a gray square in the
visual field (Fig. 11A). Now assume that the square turns red and
another neuron (n
3), which was silent, becomes active (Fig. 11B);
integrated information is 2 bits for both activity patterns. Clearly,
the activation of element n
3 changes the shape of the quale, since it
modifies almost all of the actual repertoires (insets). From the
extrinsic perspective of a neurophysiologist, if the n
3 neuron
became active every time a subject reports seeing red, it is natural
to label the activation of the ‘‘red’’ neuron n
3 as the neural
correlate of consciousness for red [24]. From the intrinsic
perspective of the complex, however, the meaning of ‘‘red’’ can
only be realized by a change in the shape of the quale triggered by
the firing of the red neuron. As shall be further discussed below,
the NCC for red cannot be captured by the firing of a particular
set of neurons, or even of larger circuits, but only by a particular
shape in Q.
Inactive elements specify the shape of a quale. The
assumption that neural elements that are active are broadcasting
information often goes hand in hand with the corollary that
inactive elements are essentially doing nothing, since they are not
broadcasting anything. According to the IIT, this is not correct. In
the general case, being ‘‘off’’ is just as informative as being ‘‘on.’’
An element that fires specifies previous states that would have
made it fire and rules out other states. Similarly, an element that
does not fire rules out previous states of affairs that would have
Figure 10. Collapse of a q-fold. (A): The quale generated by the system in Fig 3. (B): The connections in cyan are removed and replaced with
noise. The quale collapses onto a subquale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g010
Figure 11. When an element becomes active, it changes the shape of the quale. (A): the quale generated by the system in Fig. 3, when
x1=1000. (B): If element n
3 becomes active, changing the firing pattern to x1=1010, the quale changes shape. The firing of an additional element
changes almost all of the actual repertoires (see insets).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g011
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repertoire. For example, in Fig. 9B silent elements generate 4 bits
information.
In a neurophysiologic context, constraints such as energy costs
may dictate that being ‘‘on’’ should be used more sparingly than
being ‘‘off.’’ In that case, a system should reserve firing for states of
affairs that are less frequent and therefore more informative
(Balduzzi and Tononi, in preparation), so values of W may not be
as high when all elements are silent compared to when an
adequate fraction are active [3]. Even so, inactive elements remain
informative, and jointly they can rule out a vast number of
previous states. Indeed, a complex with no elements firing can
generate a quale with a non-trivial shape. Fig. 12A show such a
system, the same as in Fig. 3 and 11, but with all elements inactive.
The quale generated by a complex with all elements inactive may
be considered as the ‘‘default’’ quale. A default quale has the
prerogative of expressing geometrically all relationships imple-
mented by the system’s mechanisms, without weighing any
mechanism more than any other. Whether the brain can sustain
for sufficient periods of time a state in which no neurons are firing
(or they are all firing at a baseline rate expressing readiness but not
true activation), remains to be determined. Possibly such a state
may be reached in certain meditation practices, and may
correspond to a state of full consciousness with no particular
content [25].
There is a difference between inactive vs. inactivated
elements. As shown in the previous examples, inactive (i.e.
silent) elements generate information and thus contribute to
specifying the shape of the quale. Along the same lines, a
somewhat counterintuitive prediction stemming from the IIT is
that if elements within a complex are inactivated, rather than
merely being inactive, experience should change, although the
firing pattern is the same. Consider again Fig. 12A, where 4
inactive elements generate a default quale. In Fig. 12B, element n
2
is not merely inactive, but it has been inactivated, meaning that its
mechanism has been disabled and the connections with source n
2
have been replaced with noise. It is evident that, despite the
identical ‘‘firing pattern,’’ the quale in Fig. 12B collapsed,
shrinking dramatically in both quantity and quality. Once again,
what matters is the set of informational relationships (the shape of
the quale) generated by a given mechanism and firing pattern
together [1,3].
Concepts and learning
An informational relationships is tangled if it does not reduce to
its component relationships, see above. As introduced in the
Model section, connections considered together can generate
information above and beyond the information they generate
separately. Entanglement, which is used to define concepts and
modes, characterizes informational relationships (q-arrows) that
are more than the sum of their component relationships (Fig. 4).
Below we consider the informational advantages of entanglement.
We will also consider how learning can generate new concepts,
leading to more differentiated qualia. The next section will
consider modes.
Concepts. Figure 13A shows a system comprising 4 input
elements (sensors) and 1 output element (detector), which
implements a COPY of one input element. In doing so, the COPY
element generates 1 bit of information, whether it fires or not, and
specifies a single informational relationship (q-arrow), corres-
ponding to the simplest possible concept: that things are one way
rather than another way, just like the photodiode in Fig. 1. If the
input is pure noise (the maximum entropy distribution on 2
4=16
possible input patterns), then extracting 1 bit of information is
indeed the best a single element can do. By contrast, the ‘‘BAR’’
element in Fig. 13B ‘‘integrates’’ information from 4 sensors. If the
input is 1100, 0110, or 0011, the BAR element fires, and generates
2.4 bits of information, more than the COPY element. It can do so
because the connections it receives from the 4 sensors are tangled,
meaning that jointly they generate more information than the sum
of the information generated by each connection independently
(0.08 bits each). The corresponding tangled informational
relationship (c=0.25 bits) corresponds to the concept BAR. By
contrast, when the input pattern is not a bar (13 patterns out of 16),
the element generates 0.3 bits. On average, then, the BAR element
performs worse than the COPY element on pure noise, but can do
better, thanks to entanglement, if bars are a common statistical
feature of the input, i.e. more common than other patterns. In
general, ‘‘integrating’’ information through entanglement and the
formation of concepts is an effective strategy to extract more
information from an input under the constraint of dimensionality
reduction (here from 4 inputs to 1 output), as long as the input has
some statistical structure. Neurons are certainly well-suited to
extracting information from their input [26], and they must
Figure 12. Inactive versus inactivated elements. (A): The quale generated by the system in Fig. 3 when no elements are firing. The shape is not
drawn to scale, and is considerably smaller than that generated for x1=1000 or 1010: effective information of the whole ei(X0(maxH)RX0(T,x1))=1.2
bits, as opposed to 4 bits when element n
1 is spiking. The actual repertoire of the whole is not specified precisely. (B): By contrast, if element n
2 is
inactivated – rather than merely inactive – and connections with source n
2 are replaced with noise, the quale collapses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g012
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sands of inputs but emit a single output. Indeed, it is frequently
stated that neurons are wired to ‘‘integrate information.’’ The
notion of entanglement provides a precise formulation of this
function.
Consider now multiple detector elements. In Fig. 13C, 2
elements copy their respective input. Again, if the inputs are
distributed with maximum entropy, 2 independent COPY systems
generate the maximum possible average effective information,
whether they fire or not (2 bits for 2 binary elements). The 2
connections are not tangled (c=0), as the information they
generate jointly is equal to the sum of the information they
generate independently. In the CONCEPTUAL system (Fig. 13D),
each of 2 detector elements integrates information from 4 sensors,
just as in Fig. 13B. Again, each CONCEPTUAL element can do
better than a COPY element if there is statistical structure to the
inputs. For example, the MINORITY element generates 1.7 bits.
Note also that, since the 2 detector elements in Fig. 13D specify
different concepts (MINORITY and PARITY), they generate
information about different aspects of the input string. Indeed,
jointly the 2 CONCEPTUAL elements generate more informa-
tion (4 bits) than independently (1.7+1=2.7 bits), so their afferent
connections must be tangled (c=1.5 bits), see Section 4 of Text
S1. Since it is tangled, the CONCEPTUAL system as a whole can
generate more information than a COPY system under the
constraint of dimensionality reduction, as long as there is matching
statistical structure in the inputs. In future work, we will relate the
concepts generated by a system to Bayesian inference [27–29].
This simple example also illustrates the importance of
considering integrated information as opposed to just (effective)
information. As previously shown (Fig. 1B and 6B), the COPY
system is a collection of 2 independent parts, each generating 1 bit
of integrated information. From an extrinsic perspective, the
COPY system transmits information effectively, in this case the 2
Figure 13. Tangled concepts can generate more information about their inputs than their atomic subconcepts. (A): An element
extracts information from a set of four sensors. If the input received by the sensor layer is pure noise (the maximum entropy distribution on 2
4=16
possible firing patterns) then the best a single element can do, on average, is to extract 1 bit of information. An efficient strategy is to COPY the
output of one of the sensors, so that the element generates a concept of the form ON/OFF. (B): An element that spikes if it receives a BAR: 1100, 0110
or 0011. If a bar is presented, the 4 connections together generate 2.4 bits of information, whereas the individual connections generate 0.08 bits
independently. For the 4 connections to generate more information as a whole than separately they must be tangled: c=0.25 bits. If the input
pattern is not a bar, the element generates 0.3 bits, so that it performs worse than the COPY, on average, on maxent noise. However, if bars are
sufficiently common in the input, then the element generates more information than a COPY element. (C): Two elements COPY their inputs. This
produces the maximum possible average effective information (2 bits for 2 binary elements) assuming the inputs are maxent distributed. The
elements are not tangled, c=0, and so the whole generates information equal to the sum of the parts. (D): A cartoon cortical area: a subsystem that
receives more inputs than there are elements. If there is some statistical structure to the inputs (certain patterns are more common than others), the
system can form concepts specific to the input structure. The 2 binary elements shown generate 4 bits of information about the input pattern, more
than the elements taken individually (2.7 bits). On average, using maxent, the 2 elements generate 1.8 bits, less than the COPY elements. However, if
the inputs are structured and so not maxent, the elements can generate more information about other cortical areas than they should ‘‘by right’’ by
tangling informational relationships into concepts and modes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g013
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perspective, there is no single entity that ‘‘knows’’ the state of both
sensors W=0 bits; there are instead 2 independent systems, each of
which ‘‘knows’’ 1 bit about its respective sensor (see Text S1,
Section 1). By contrast, the CONCEPTUAL system integrates
information (W=4 bits): it constitutes a complex that knows both
inputs as a single entity, above and beyond what its parts know.
Specifically, in this case the complex knows that the entire sensor
layer is silent, since it knows at once that the input is ,2 and even.
Integrating information would seem to be an advantage for
organisms that need to make unified decisions that are sensitive to
context. As shown in Section 4 of Text S1, entanglement ensures
that elements are part of a complex, and thus that W.0 bits.
Qualia can become more complex by learning new
concepts. Experiences can be refined through learning and
changes in connectivity [30–33]. Say one learns to distinguish wine
from water, then red from white and rose ´ wines, then different
varietals. Presumably, underlying this phenomenological refine-
ment is a neurobiological refinement: neurons that initially were
connected indiscriminately to the same afferents, become more
specialized and split into sub-groups with partially segregated
afferents. This process has a straightforward equivalent in Q: the
single q-arrow generated initially by those afferents splits into two or
more q-arrows pointing in different directions, and the overall sub-
shape of the quale becomes increasingly complex.
Fig. 14A shows the quale generated by a system where 2
detector elements receive identical connections from all 4 sensors.
For 3 different input patterns (say rose ´, red, and white wines) the
responses of the detectors is the same: both elements are firing,
indicating the detection of wine as opposed to water (in which case
Figure 14. Learning to distinguish new experiences enriches the shape of the quale generated by a system. (A): A system of elements,
containing two detectors (AND-gates that respond to .1 spike) and four sensors, on which we focus attention. The sensors have all-to-all
connections with the detectors. Both detectors are firing, which occurs for any of the sensor patterns 1011, 1010 and 0011 (amongst others): ‘‘wine’’.
(B): The quale generated by the system. The maroon and gray submechanisms (containing 4 connections targeting each detector) generate a single
q-arrow due to the redundancy of the all-to-all connectivity. The system generates the same quale in response to three different sensor patterns:
‘‘rose ´ wine’’ (1011), ‘‘red wine’’ (1010) and ‘‘white wine’’ (0011). (C): The system learns to distinguish between types of wine by pruning three
connections; as before detectors are AND-gates, however, since their inputs differ they are no longer redundant. (DEF): The three sensor patterns
generate three different qualia. Moreover, each quale is richer than in panel B: the single q-arrow has split into 4 q-arrows, reflecting the increased
richness in how the taste of different wines is specified.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g014
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concepts generated by the elements: the 2 submechanisms
consisting of connections targeting the two detectors are
redundant and generate a single q-arrow in the quale onto which
all 3 wine patterns collapse: the experience is an undifferentiated
one of wine (as opposed to water; we are assuming here that the
quale is much larger than what is actually drawn, including all the
context necessary to specify that these are gustatory experiences
having to do with liquids).
Suppose that learning the difference between red and white
wine causes the detectors to become specialized by pruning some
connections (Fig. 14C). Since the 2 elements have different
mechanisms (in this case, they receive from different subsets of
sensors, and thus specify 2 different concepts), the information they
generate is no longer redundant. As a consequence, the shape of
the quale becomes more complex, even for exactly the same firing
pattern. Indeed, when both detectors are firing, the shape encodes
‘‘rose ´’’ as opposed to red or white, each of which would give rise to
a different shape. Thus, with learning experience becomes more
differentiated, and this differentiation is reflected in an increased
complexity of the shape of the underlying qualia.
Modes
In the Model section, modes were defined, by analogy with
complexes, as q-arrows that are more densely tangled than
surrounding q-arrows. Whether a complex consists of a single
mode or of multiple modes and submodes depends as usual on both
itsconnectivity(mechanism) and activitypattern. Inwhat followswe
argue that the subdivision of experience into modalities and
submodalities corresponds to sub-shapes (modes) in Q. Moreover,
we argue that qualia in the narrow sense are elementary modes (not
further decomposable); and that homogeneous/composite experi-
ences are homogeneous/composite shapes.
Modes and submodes are a function of both connectivity
and activity patterns. Figure 15A shows a complex made up of
AND-gates(here eachAND hassixafferents) that constitutes a single
mode, indicated as a single pink blob having c=6.1. Eliminating
certain connections gives rise to two separate modes, indicated as
neighboring cyan (c=2.46) and orange blobs (c=2.53). However,
the system still forms a single complex, and indeed there is a larger,
albeit weaker, mode encompassing all connections with c=0.15. In
Fig. 15C, eliminating other connections gives rise to 4 separate
modes. In this case, the complex does not form a single mode (c=0).
Thus, the quale or shape generated by a complex (which is by
definition a single entity) can contain two or more independent
(orthogonal) modes or subshapes.
Just like the shape of a quale can change depending on whether
an element is active or not, the modes or subshapes generated by a
complex with a given connectivity can change depending on
which elements are active. Figure 15DEF shows a grid-like system
of AND-gates in three different states. When no elements are
firing, as in panel D (and also when all elements are firing), the
complex forms a single mode. The firing of a single element, as in
panel E, causes the 4 elements targeting the one that is firing to
form a single main mode with W=2.4 bits. The system as a whole
forms a much weaker mode, with W=0.23 bits. Finally, panel F
shows a more complex firing pattern that generates two
overlapping modes (cyan and orange) of approximately equal
entanglement, as well as additional modes (not shown) with
substantial overlap with the orange and cyan modes.
Some phenomenological parallels: modalities and
submodalities. Experience seems to divide naturally into
modalities, like the classic senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell,
and taste (and several others), as well as submodalities, like visual
color and visual shape. What do these broad distinctions
correspond to in Q? According to the IIT, modalities are sets of
densely tangled q-arrows (modes) that form distinct sub-shapes in
the quale; submodalities are subsets of even more densely tangled
q-arrows (sub-modes) within a larger mode, thus forming distinct
sub-sub-shapes. As schematically represented in Figure 15G, if the
entire quale is like a very large and complex shape, modalities are
like main subdivisions of its shape into sub-shapes of higher
density, and submodalities are sub-sub-shapes nested within
modalities, of even higher density.
In a system such as the brain, two main modes might
correspond for example to the visual and auditory modalities. As
would be expected, the visual and auditory system, especially early
in the cortical hierarchy, are heavily interconnected within each
system, and much less between systems. As illustrated schemati-
cally in Fig. 15B, such an arrangement may give rise to a large
complex giving rise to a weakly tangled mode, subdivided into two
main submodes. Such a complex could give rise to a quale
corresponding, for example, to the simultaneous experience, by
the same subject, of a bright flash and a loud bang. In other words,
although the concepts ‘‘flash’’ and ‘‘bang’’ are distinct (two
separate strong modes), they both fall under a single experience – a
flash and a bang (the large, weaker mode). To the extent that, say
by repeated exposure, a new concept were formed that strongly
entangles the corresponding q-arrows, the experience would
change into that of a ‘‘flashbang’’ or thunderbolt.
Some experiences appear to be ‘‘elementary,’’ in that
they cannot be further decomposed. Sub-modes that do not
contain any more densely tangled sub-sub-modes are elementary
modes (i.e., elementary shapes that cannot be further decomposed).
According to the IIT, such elementary modes correspond to aspects
of experience that cannot be further analyzed, meaning that no
further phenomenological structure is recognizable. The term
qualia (in a narrow sense) is often used to refer to such elementary
experiences, such as a pure color like red, or a pain, or an itch
(Fig. 15G).
Some experiences are homogeneous and others are
composite. In the Introduction we mentioned the experience
of pure darkness as a paradigmatic one. Like an experience of pure
light, pure red, pure blue, it shares the property of being extremely
simple to describe in words: after we say that we see pure darkness,
pure light, pure red, pure blue and so on, there seems to be
nothing that we have left out. The corresponding quale, or shape
in qualia space, is certainly not simple, as it entails presumably a
large complex of informational relationships, and seeing pure
darkness effectively rules out a very large number of states from the
potential repertoire. In fact, the seeming ‘‘simplicity’’ of such pure,
vivid sensations may be the main reason why the gap between
neural activity and experience seems impossible to bridge. On the
other hand, consider the experience of being immersed in the flow
of people and traffic in a busy market street. Such an experience
appears to be composed of a multitude of modalities,
submodalities, and different parts, and it is very hard to describe
- it may take a novelist several pages to do it justice. Though every
experience is one, homogeneous experiences would be expected to
translate in Q into a single homogeneous shape, and composite
ones into a composite shape with many distinguishable sub-shapes
(modes and sub-modes). Such a contrast is shown, in the simplest
possible terms, in Fig. 15 A vs. C.
Phenomenology and geometry: classifying and
comparing shapes
If an experience is a shape in Q, in principle it should be
possible to classify different experiences, or different aspects of the
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should be possible to compare experiences or aspects thereof the
way one might compare shapes, and obtain some objective
indication of how similar they are. At present, a comprehensive
approach to classifying and comparing qualia geometrically is
not feasible, not only because of the obstacles to specifying qualia
Figure 15. Modes depend on network structure and network activity. Elements in all panels are AND-gates firing if they receive 2 or more
spikes. Lines represent bidirectional arrows. (ABC): Modes and network structure. (A): A honeycomb grid (with bidirectional connections and torus
edges) generates a single mode. c(‘‘orange’’) computes entanglement for the elements colored orange in panel B. (B): Removing most of the diagonal
connections, results in a system containing two weakly tangled modes, shown in cyan and orange, arranged in a chessboard-pattern. The single
diagonal connection loosely tangles the two modes. (C): A diagonal slice of a feedforward grid. Each layer of the grid is a separate mode,
disentangled from the others. (DEF): Modes and network activity. (D): ‘‘Nothingness’’. A silent system forms a single, homogeneous mode. (E): ‘‘Pure
red’’. The system as a whole forms a weak mode (orange). The strongest mode (cyan) is created by the firing of a single element. (F): ‘‘A composite
experience’’. A more complex firing pattern results in multiple overlapping modes, two of which are shown. (G): A 2D cartoon of modes in a quale. At
the top is the color mode. Currently, the system is exposed to a red stimulus, so the informational relationships within the mode specify the redness
of red: the direction of the q-arrows within the mode – and how they are tangled – is what makes red different from green or blue. However, the
context afforded to red – the fact that it is a visual rather than auditory experience – is not a property of the color mode. The color mode is contained
in a series of larger modes: form, vision, perception, which fill in the context in which the redness of red is specified. The vision mode as a whole is a
tangled concept, which cannot be decomposed into independent subconcepts, even though the submodes, such as color and motion, have a certain
amount of independence. Color is always associated with a shape of some kind (a totally red visual field is a particular shape), and also motion
(awareness of lack of motion is awareness of a kind of motion), and so forth. The quale of the entire system itself forms a mode since c.0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g015
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for comparing different qualia have yet to be developed. To
provide an indication of how a geometry of phenomenology might
proceed, we offer two simple examples. Thus, we suggest that
topographic/categorical experiences may be organized like
multidimensional grids/pyramids in Q; and that hierarchically
organized experiences may be tangled both ‘‘horizontally’’ and
vertically’’ into hierarchically organized subshapes in Q. Finally,
we argue that treating experiences as shapes suggests a principled
way of assessing their similarity and dissimilarity.
Of grids and pyramids, or whether aspects of experience
may be classified geometrically. We recognize intuitively
that the way we perceive taste, smell, and maybe color, is
organized phenomenologically in a ‘‘categorical’’ manner, quite
different from, say, the ‘‘topographical’’ manner in which we
perceive space in vision, audition, or touch. According to the IIT,
these hard to articulate phenomenological differences correspond
to different basic sub-shapes in Q, such as grid-like structures and
pyramid-like structures. In turn, these emerge naturally from the
underlying neuroanatomy and neuronal activity patterns.
Many sensory areas, especially early on the cortical hierarchy,
are organized topographically [34], very much like a grid. What
does this basic neuroanatomical arrangement contribute to the
quality of experience? In other words, what it is like to be a grid?
Figure 16A shows a honeycomb grid: elements receive connections
from 6 neighboring elements and fire if they receive more than 3
spikes. Consider a silent element on the left, surrounded by 6 gray
elements, with 3 out of its 6 afferent connections shown in pink.
The concept generated by its afferent connections can be
characterized as ‘‘local activity below threshold.’’ In Q, the
corresponding q-arrow is the gray one that tangles the pink-q-
arrows at the bottom of the quale (generated by the pink
connections). Consider next another silent element on the right
(surrounded by brown elements, with afferent connections shown
in blue), which is spatially removed from the first, and which
generates another instantiation of the concept ‘‘local activity below
threshold.’’ In Q, the corresponding concept is a brown q-arrow
that tangles the blue q-arrows at the bottom of the quale. The two
concepts (gray and brown q-arrows) are not tangled at the bottom
of the quale, so there is no concept corresponding to ‘‘local activity
below threshold in these two separate areas.’’
However, if the two elements are neighbors, the concept
generated by their connections tangle, since afferents that are
topographically adjacent jointly specify an actual repertoire more
precisely than if considered independently. The resulting tangled
q-arrow, shown in beige, corresponds to the concept ‘‘larger patch
of local activity below threshold.’’ In this manner, one neighboring
element after the other, entanglement progressively expands q-
Figure 16. The qualia generated by topographical grids and categorizing pyramids. (A) A honeycomb grid and a schematic
representation of part of the quale generated by the grid. In the grid, each element is bidirectionally connected to its 6 neighbors, and fires if it
receives 3 or more spikes. The cell at the center of the gray area is silent, and so generates the concept ‘‘local activity below threshold’’. Three of the
connections targeting the cell are shown in pink; the corresponding q-arrows at the bottom of the quale are tangled into the overarching concept
given by the larger gray q-arrow. Similarly for the cell at the center of the brown area that – as shown in the quale – tangles the connections shown in
blue. The quale shows how the grid generates two concepts for ‘‘local activity below threshold’’ in two different regions (the two deformed cubes
generated by pink and cyan q-arrows). The concept generated by th pink q-arrows taken as a whole is represented by a gray q-arrow at the bottom
of the quale; similarly a brown q-arrow is drawn for the concept generated by the cyan q-arrows as a whole. The combined concept ‘‘activity below
threshold in the gray and brown regions’’ does not exist for the grid because the brown and gray q-arrows are not tangled at the bottom of the quale.
The overarching informational relationship generated by the gray, beige and brown areas together does form a single concept in the quale ‘‘regional
activity below threshold’’. (B): Part of a categorizing pyramid extracting invariants from a grid and a schematic of the quale. The categorizing pyramid
has near all-to-all connectivity, so there is no topographic structure, which is reflected in the quale by tangling ‘‘all the way down’’. In contrast to the
grid, where the topographic structure serves to prevent concepts from tangling at the bottom of the quale, giving the experience a spatial aspect,
the all-to-all connectivity results in all concepts tangling into a single indivisible experience similar to color or smell.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g016
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the quale all q-arrows (here the gray, brown and beige ones)
become tangled into the concept ‘‘activity below threshold
everywhere.‘‘In the end, the geometry of the quale would reflect
the nearest neighbor architecture of the grid, building concepts
from local pieces centered on elements, up to a single global gestalt
(the grid forms a single mode). An element firing would then warp
the tangled shape generated by the silent grid corresponding to the
concept ‘‘local activity above threshold here and below threshold
everywhere else.’’ In this vein, the example in Fig. 16A could be
interpreted as a cartoon model of the spatial aspects of vision,
audition, or somesthesia.
Consider now a simple system that is organized like a
categorizing pyramid (Figure 16B). Here, each element in the
upper level, through afferents originating throughout the lower
level, generates a concept that globally categorizes its input, along
the lines of Fig. 13. As in Fig. 13, each concept is assumed to be
tangled in Q, meaning that the sum of the information generated
by all afferents is more than the information generated by the
afferents separately. Moreover, as in Fig. 13, each concept is
assumed to specify a different set of firing patterns at the lower
level, that is, each concept is different, and different concepts are
tangled, so that together they generate more information than
separately. In Q, afferents of different elements are tangled starting
already at the bottom of the quale and all the way up to the top. In
contrast to the grid, where the topographic structure prevents
concepts generated by distant elements from tangling at the
bottom of the quale, thereby giving the experience a ‘‘spatial’’
aspect, the forward all-to-all connectivity of the pyramid in the
cartoon model of Fig. 16C,D results in all concepts tangling from
the beginning, perhaps similar to color, taste or smell.
This example is also meant to illustrate how basic features of
neuroanatomical organization contribute to determining the
quality of experience. On one hand, there is overwhelming
evidence that different brain areas contribute different aspects to
the quality of consciousness. On the other hand, the present
approach suggests that the contribution of different neuroanatom-
ical structures to experience is not direct (and mysterious). Instead,
the contribution of different brain areas to experience would be
mediated (and explained) by how their connectivity, together with
their activity patterns, specifies shapes in qualia space.
Phenomenological hierarchies: building shapes vertically
and horizontally. Much of experience is hierarchically
organized [35,36] and, perhaps not coincidentally, so is the
organization of sensory pathways in the cortex [37–39]. Take
seeing a face: we see at once that as a whole it is somebody’s face,
but we also see that it has parts such as hair, eyes, nose and mouth,
and that those are made in turn of specifically oriented segments.
Correspondingly, neurophysiologic experiments indicate that
neurons in early visual areas respond to oriented segments.
Presumably, there are also neurons responding to eyes, noses and
mouths. In areas higher in the visual hierarchy, there are neurons
that respond to faces, often in a position invariant manner. How
can the informational relationships generated by these neurons
and their mechanisms combined to give rise to the percept of a
face?
Consider the diagram in Fig. 17A. Feature detectors in a
primary cortical area specify that there may be some edges in some
locations of the retina grid. Tangled ‘‘horizontally’’ in a
topographic manner, meaning with connections afferent to other
neurons in the same area, they specify a certain contour. In Q, as
illustrated schematically in Fig. 17B (clockwise q-edge of the
quale), this contour information provides a natural context on top of
which to tangle, ‘‘vertically,’’ the contribution of neurons in a
higher area whose connections specify the presence of eyes, nose,
and mouth. On top of this richer context, ‘‘face’’ neurons in even
higher areas are tangled, again vertically, to specify a face.
The counter-clockwise edge of the quale illustrates how the
‘‘face’’ connections on their own specify that the retina-grid was
presented with a face-like object, ruling out alternatives such as
house-like, car-like, and so on. However, the details of the face are
missing, and the face-neurons cannot specify how the face looks.
Figure 17. Hierarchical experiences. (A): Higher-order feature detectors extract a hierarchy of patterns (edges, features, and faces) from a retina-
like grid. (B): A schematic depiction of the quale generated by the hierarchy; since each pattern-detector contains many elements and connections,
the actual quale will be vastly more complicated than the simple cartoon shown here. The actual repertoires generated along two q-edges are
shown. First, consider the clockwise q-edge. The cyan connections – targeting the edge detectors – specify that the image presented to the retina
contains certain edges. The edge and feature detectors taken together specify that the edges coalesce into features such as a mouth, nose and eyes.
Finally, all the connections in the hierarchy specify the particular face that is shown to the retina. Going around anti-clockwise, the ‘‘face’’ connections
on their own specify that the retina-grid was presented with a face-like object, however, the details of the face are unspecified, since the concepts for
mouth etc. are not generated by the face-neurons. Engaging the connections targeting the feature-neurons fills out some of the details of the face,
the broad outlines of how the nose, mouth and eyes appear. Finally, adding connections targeting the edge-neurons specifies the face precisely. The
informational relationships generated by neurons in a tangled quale cannot be described in isolation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000462.g017
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some of the details of the face, the broad outlines of nose, mouth
and eyes, and more details are added by the edge-neurons. In the
context provided by the edge and feature neurons, the face-
neurons again rule out the alternatives, however now the
alternatives are far more detailed. The q-arrows specified by
these various sets of connections would be expected to be highly
tangled, embodying relationships within and across levels, and
generating more information that the sum of their component q-
arrows. For example, informational relationships constituting a
‘‘face’’ would be more densely tangled than unnatural combina-
tions such as one eye and a lower lip. Back-connections and lateral
connections may play a role (beyond their role in learning and
attention) by allowing higher-order invariants to inform – and so
tangle with – lower order invariants. Indeed, psychophysical
experiments have shown that feature recognition involves
extensive filling-in of lower-order features [40].
Altogether, according to the present approach, the experience
of a person’s face, with its faceness, its eyes, nose and mouth, its
precise contour and spatial location, would not be captured by any
individual neuron or population of neurons, whether face cells or
not, whether firing or not, whether synchronous or not, but by the
generation of a set of informational relationships within a complex,
i.e. a particular sub-shape in Q.
Phenomenological similarities and dissimilarities: com-
paring shapes. Some experiences are more alike than others.
Blue is certainly different from red (and irreducible to red), but
clearly it seems even more different from middle C on the oboe. In
the IIT framework, colors correspond to different sub-shapes of
the same kind (say pyramids pointing in different directions) and
sounds to very different sub-shapes in Q. In principle, such
subjective similarities and differences can be investigated by
employing objective measures of similarity between shapes [41–
43]. For example, one could consider the number and kinds of
symmetries involved in specifying shapes that are generated in Q
by different neuroanatomical circuits. Though this perspective will
not be pursued here, in principle it opens the door to
mathematical approaches already employed in other fields or
susceptible to theoretical development.
Considering the quantity of consciousness as given by the
repertoire of states that can be discriminated by a single system,
and its quality by the shape of the set of informational relationships
generated by its connections, may also shed some light on the
effects of splitting the brain along the corpus callosum in severely
epileptic patients [2]. Such patients appear to possess two distinct
consciousnesses, one localized in each hemisphere. Particularly
surprising is that the dominant (verbal) hemisphere appears to
behave similarly to an intact brain, and reports largely similar
experiences [44]. As shown in Section 7 of Text S1, the shape of
the quale generated by certain systems can be indifferent to the
number of elements if the system contains redundancies or
degeneracies [45]. Therefore, it is possible that the quale
generated by a single hemisphere may be similar, in a quantifiable
sense, to the quale generated by the entire brain, entailing
comparable quantity and quality of consciousness.
Seeing red
In this last section, we revisit the question of the quality of
consciousness by considering a paradigmatic quale – say seeing red
– and discussing how such an experience should be thought of, at
least in principle, from the point of view of the IIT. We choose a
color not only because it is a traditional example in philosophy, but
because we can lend it a minimum of concreteness by referring to
some evidence from neurology and neuropsychology (another
clinical syndrome that would lend itself naturally to this sort of
analysis is neglect [46]). This final demonstration is inevitably bare-
bones. Nevertheless, it should serve the purpose of illustrating how,
according to the IIT, the ‘‘redness’’ of red, and similarly any
qualitative aspect of experience, is not specified by the firing of
particular neurons, nor by particular patterns of activity or
correlations, nor is it a property of certain anatomical circuits, but
it exists only at the level of the set of informational relationships
generated by a complex of elements in a certain state. Specifically,
the ‘‘redness’’ of red, and similarly any qualitative aspect of
experience, corresponds to a specific q-fold within a quale,
generated by the activation of a set of specialized mechanisms. As
such, it exists only in the context of the quale, just like a particular
convexity in a complex solid only exists in the context of the solid.
This perspective also implies that specific qualities of consciousness,
while generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it.
The NCC of red specifies the ‘‘redness’’ of red only in the
full context of a quale. Consider, then, the experience of
seeing a pure color, such as red. The evidence suggests that the
‘‘neural correlate’’ or NCC [47] of color, including red, is
probably a set of neurons and connections in the fusiform gyrus,
maybe in area V8. Ideally, neurons in this area are activated
whenever a subject sees red and not otherwise, if stimulated trigger
the experience of red, and if lesioned abolish the capacity to see
red. Certain subjects with dysfunctions in this general area, who
are otherwise perfectly conscious, seem to lack the feeling of what
it is like to see color, its ‘‘coloredness,’’ including the ‘‘redness’’ of
red. Such achromatopsic subjects cannot experience, imagine,
remember and even dream of color, though they may talk about it,
just as we could talk about echolocation, from a third person
perspective [48]. Contrast such subjects with vegetative patients,
who are for all intents and purposes unconscious. Some of these
patients may show behavioral and neurophysiologic evidence for
residual function in an isolated brain area [49]. Yet it seems highly
unlikely that a vegetative patient with residual activity exclusively
in V8 should enjoy the vivid perceptions of color just as we do,
while being otherwise unconscious.
The IIT provides a straightforward account for this difference.
To see how, consider again Fig. 9: call r the connections targeting
the ‘‘red’’ neurons in V8 that confer them their selectivity, and
non-r (\]r) all the other connections within the main corticotha-
lamic complex. Adding r in isolation at the bottom of Q (null
context), yields a small q-arrow (called the down-set of red or Qr)
that points in a direction representing how r by itself shapes the
maximum entropy distribution into an actual repertoire. Sche-
matically, this situation resembles that of a vegetative patient with
V8 and its afferents intact but the rest of the corticothalamic
system destroyed. The shape of the experience or quale reduces to
this q-arrow, so its quantity is minimal (W for this q-arrow is
obviously low) and its quality minimally specified: as we have seen
with the photodiode, r by itself cannot specify whether the
experience is a color rather than something else, such as a shape,
whether it is visual or not, sensory or not, and so on.
By contrast, subtract r from the set of all connections, so one is
left with \]r. This ‘‘lesion’’ collapses all q-arrows generated by r
starting from any context, that is, it folds the quale along the q-fold
specified by r, as we saw in Fig. 10. Prominent within the q-fold
generated by r in the quale is the informational relationship that
starts from the full context, provided by all other connections \]r,
and reaches the top of the quale, called the up-set of non-red (q\]r).
This q-arrow will typically be much longer and point in a different
direction than the q-arrow generated by r in the null context at the
bottom of the quale, as we saw in Fig. 9. This is because, the fuller
the context, the more r can shape the actual repertoire.
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an achromatopsic patient with a selective lesion of V8: the bulk of
the experience or quale remains intact (W remains high), but a
noticeable feature of its shape, the q-fold specified by r, collapses.
According to the IIT, it is this q-fold that constitutes the ‘‘redness
of red.’’ More precisely, the feature of the shape of the quale
specified by the up-set of non-red, which includes as a context all
other connections, including those specifying other colors, captures
the quality or ‘‘redness’’ with respect to other colors. Lower q-
arrows in the q-fold of red contribute to specifying the ‘‘color-
edness’’ of red with respect to other visual attributes, such as shape
or motion, lower ones its ‘‘visualness’’ with respect to other sensory
modalities, its ‘‘perceptualness’’ as opposed to thought, and so on.
It is worth remarking that, while the quality of red specified by
the q-fold of r in the above example refers to one particular
experience, it is in principle conceivable to determine, in an
objective manner, what different experiences described as red by a
conscious subject, or even by different subjects, may have in
common. Once again, one would need to establish what aspects of
the shape of different qualia remain similar across different
experiences of red from the same subject or different subjects.
The last example also shows why specific qualities of
consciousness, such as the ‘‘redness’’ of red, while generated by a local
mechanism, cannot be reduced to it. If an achromatopsic subject without
the r connections lacks precisely the ‘‘redness’’ of red, whereas a
vegetative patient with just the r connections is essentially
unconscious, then the redness of red cannot map directly to the
mechanism implemented by the r connections. However, the
redness of red can map nicely onto the informational relationships
specified by r, as these change dramatically between the null
context (vegetative patient) and the full context (achromatopsic
subject).
Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we have briefly reviewed the notion of integrated
information, the amount of information generated by a complex of
elements above and beyond the information generated by its
minimal parts, measured by W. We have then introduced the
notion of qualia space (Q) as a space with an axis for each possible
state of the complex. Each submechanism of the complex specifies
a probability distribution of system states, corresponding to a point
in Q. Arrows between points (probability distributions) in Q (q-
arrows) define informational relationships among the elements of
the complex (the effective information matrix [1]). Together, all
these informational relationships specify a quale Q(mech, x1),
which is a shape (high dimensional solid or polytope) in Q space.
We argued that this shape completely and univocally characterizes
the quality of a conscious experience. W – the height of this solid –
is the quantity of consciousness associated with the experience.
High W allows ‘‘breathing room’’ for the informational relation-
ships within a complex to express themselves, while if W is reduced
the quale collapses.
We have examined several corollaries that can be derived from
these premises. For example, only informational relationships
within a complex are part of the same quale. The shape of the
quale is always determined by the mechanism (connectivity) and
the state of the elements (activity pattern) considered together.
Thus, two systems having exactly the same activity pattern may
give rise to completely different qualia, depending on their
mechanism. In the limit of no mechanism – a system that merely
copies its state from another one – no quale is generated.
Conversely, exactly the same quale may be generated by two
systems that differ both in terms of connectivity and activity
patterns. For example, a silent AND-gate and a firing OR-gate
generate isomorphic qualia. On the other hand, in more complex
systems many symmetries are likely to be broken, making it
extremely unlikely that two different systems that are sufficiently
complex may generate the same quale.
Some of the results derived from the present approach lend
themselves to a neurophysiologic interpretation. For example, we
have seen that both active and inactive elements specify a quale.
Thus,asysteminwhichallelementsaresilentcanstillspecifyaquale
with a complex shape. On the other hand, while elements that are
inactive contribute to specifying a quale, elements that are
inactivated (incapable of becoming active) do not, even though,
from an extrinsic perspective, the pattern of activity may not have
changed. Also, when an element within a complex becomes active, it
changes the shape of the quale. The implication is that the meaning
of the firing of a given element (neuron) is given not by what its
extrinsicallyimposedlabelmightbe(a‘‘red’’neuron ora‘‘face’’cell),
nor by the information it broadcasts to other elements (‘red’’ or
‘‘face’’), but by the new shape in Q it contributes to specifying.
Generating more concrete links between the techniques
developed here and experimental data requires robust causal
models of neuronal activity. Recently, a large body of work on
dynamic causal modeling (DCM) has been developed attacking
exactly this problem, for example [50–52]. DCM takes a
perturbational approach to modeling neuronal interactions,
treating an experiment as a targeted perturbation of a set of
interacting neuronal populations. Causal models are fitted to
experimental data using Bayesian techniques; thus, the output of
DCM – a causal model – is exactly what the IIT requires as an
input. Connecting the two formalisms will require some effort
since DCM uses continuous rather than discrete models, however
this appears to be a technical rather than conceptual obstacle (see
Section 1 of Text S1). DCM thus provides a possible bridge
between empirical data and the approach developed in this paper.
It should be pointed out that this paper investigates the quality
of the informational relationships generated by a system without
any reference to the environment and to the issues posed by
sensory processing or by learning. The important problem of how
a system can integrate information in such a way as to match its
environment will be treated in future work.
The present approach can help to rephrase basic phenomeno-
logical and neuropsychological observations in a geometrical
language. For example, we have seen how entanglement – which
occurs when a submechanism gives rise to an informational
relationship that cannot be decomposed into its component
relationships, generates concepts and modes Entanglement is
necessary for dimensionality reduction from many inputs to a
single output, which is an essential informational requirement for
neurons. Entanglement helps to increase integrated information,
ensuring that a complex can make highly informative discrimina-
tions as a single entity.
We have also seen how informational relationships can be
refined through learning, thereby generating a more differentiated
experience or quale. After introducing the notion of modes – sets
of densely tangled informational relationship, we have argued that
the subdivision of experience into modalities and submodalities
corresponds to subshapes (modes) in Q; that qualia in the narrow
sense are elementary modes (not further decomposable such as the
‘‘redness’’ of red); and that homogeneous/composite experiences
are homogeneous/composite shapes. Also, the notion of modes
clarifies how some phenomenological aspects may appear largely
orthogonal (say visual and auditory details) and yet be part of the
same experience or quale in the broad sense.
Finally, we have argued that it may in principle be possible to
obtain a geometrical classification of aspects of experience in terms
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a tentative example, we suggested that topographic/categorical
experiences may be like grids/pyramids in Q; and that
hierarchically organized experiences are tangled both ‘‘horizon-
tally’’ and vertically’’ into hierarchically organized subshapes. We
have also argued that the similarity between experiences reduces
to similarities between shapes. Finally, we have argued that specific
qualities of consciousness, such as the ‘‘redness’’ of red, while
generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it, but
require considering the shape of the entire quale, within which
they constitute a q-fold.
These abstract geometrical notions may seem at first to be far
removed from the immediacy of experience. At present, due to the
combinatorial problems posed by deriving the shape of the quale
produced by systems of just a few elements, and to the additional
difficulties posed by representing such high-dimensional objects,
the best one can hope for is to show that the language of Q can
capture, in principle, some of the basic distinctions that can be
made in our own phenomenology. Ultimately, however, the goal
of the present framework is to offer a principled way to begin
translating the seemingly ineffable qualitative properties of
experience into the language of mathematics.
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